Measuring the deadly embrace: Systemic and sovereign risks

This study contributes to the literature by making a first step toward implementing a comprehensive internally coherent measurement of systemic risk in a country. It measures systemic risk and the ensuing conditional contingent liabilities of the sovereign stemming from Luxembourg’s Other Systemically Important Institutions (OSIIs), the Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) to which they belong, the investment funds sponsored by the OSIIs, the household and the non-financial corporate sectors. The ensuing estimated systemic contingent claims are included in a stochastic version of the general government’s balance sheet to gauge their impact on the country’s sovereign risk. Results indicate that time-varying conditional implicit guarantees from OSSIs are larger than those from G-SIBs and investment funds, while systemic risk stemming from the household and non-financial corporate sectors is moderate. The robustness of the sovereign is not drastically affected by systemic risk stemming from the rest of the economy. However, illustrating the so-called “deadly embrace”, sovereign risk would significantly rise as a result of a historically plausible increase in sovereign assets’ value volatility combined with an economy-wide shock. The main policy implication is that financial stability stands on two columns, a resilient financial sector and a sustainable fiscal position.     

Why is credit-to-GDP a good measure for setting countercyclical capital buffers?

We examine banks’ loan losses in Europe in 1982–2012 using a nonlinear three-factor model that takes into account output growth, real interest rate, and the ratio of private credit to GDP relative to its trend (i.e., “excessive indebtedness”). We find that a drop in output has an intensified impact on loan losses if the private sector is excessively indebted. Because increased bank credit risk should be matched with higher bank capital, the result motivates the Basel III's countercyclical capital buffers as a function of private indebtedness relative to its trend. The result also helps to explain differences in the amount of loan losses in different recessions across time and across countries. The model also indicates that low interest rates during the recent recession have clearly mitigated loan losses.     

Freeing Greece from capital controls: Were the restrictions enforced in time?

Recent developments in Greece have caused for the implementation of banking capital controls on the outflow of funds, a policy decision not uncommon, especially in emerging markets. However, the issues of the Greek economy, which seem to stem from the public sector but have been passed on to the banking sector, pose a unique challenge to researchers. In this paper, we employ VBanking, an object-oriented model for banking simulations to examine whether capital controls in Greece were enforced at the appropriate time. Additionally, we propose that the banking sector will not purge this regulation soon. Finally, we demonstrate the destructive effects of capital controls both on the financial system and on the real economy. We present the empirical results of our work, which suggest that the Greek authorities’ response to the deterioration of the banking sector was lagged.     

论电子银行个人结售汇业务的发展及监管

电子银行个人结售汇业务的出现满足了银行外汇业务自主化的需要,为银行外汇业务的创新和发展提供了拓展空间。本文通过深入分析当前我国电子银行个人结售汇业务对银行业及涉外经济的影响,深入剖析外汇监管方面存在的问题,并对此提出建议。     

Trade credit and the joint effects of supplier and customer financial characteristics

We examine how access to bank credit affects trade credit in the supplier–customer relationships of U.S. public firms. For identification, we use exogenous liquidity shocks to supplier firms in the form of staggered changes to interstate bank branching laws. Using a variety of tests, we show that supplier firms with greater access to banking liquidity offer more trade credit to their customers. We also show that when bank branching restrictions are relaxed in the supplier’s state, the supplier–customer relationship is more likely to survive.     

The effects of resolution methods and industry stress on the loss on assets from bank failures

In this paper, we examine how the value of failed bank assets differs between two types of FDIC resolution methods: liquidation and private-sector reorganization. Our findings show that private-sector reorganizations do not deliver the expected cost-savings from 1986 to 1991, a period of industry distress. On a univariate basis, the net loss on assets is lower for a private-sector reorganization than for a liquidation in both a period of industry distress and of industry health. However, institutions with higher quality assets and higher franchise values are more likely to be resolved using a private-sector resolution. Once we control for this selection bias, we find that institutions that are resolved during periods of industry distress result in higher resolution costs than liquidation. During periods of industry health, private-sector resolutions are less costly than liquidations. We show that if a bank that failed during the post-crisis period instead failed during the crisis period, its net loss as a percent of assets would have been 3.232 percentage points higher. Given that the average net loss on assets ratio is 21.42 percent during our sample period from 1986 to 2007, the increase in costs is economically significant.     

Financial liberalization and bank risk-taking: International evidence

This paper analyzes the channels through which financial liberalization affects bank risk-taking in an international sample of 4333 banks in 83 countries. Our results indicate that financial liberalization increases bank risk-taking in both developed and developing countries but through different channels. Financial liberalization promotes stronger bank competition that increases risk-taking incentives in developed countries, whereas in developing countries it increases bank risk by expanding opportunities to take risk. Capital requirements help reduce the negative impact of financial liberalization on financial stability in both developed and developing countries. However, official supervision and financial transparency are only effective in developing countries.     

商业银行偿付能力风险、流动性风险与银行体系风险

宏观审慎监管需要微观基础.研究商业银行偿付能力风险与流动性风险和银行体系风险的关系,有助于监管当局制定合适的监管工具,有效管理银行业的系统性风险.中国未曾爆发过真正意义的银行业危机,因而研究影响银行业系统性风险的因素成为难题.在借鉴风险二维定义属性基础上,本文对商业银行偿付能力风险和流动性风险如何影响银行业稳定进行了实证分析.分析结果表明,当商业银行偿付能力上升时,银行风险承担会上升,进而增加银行倒闭的预期损失;商业银行流动性风险的上升也会增加银行倒闭的预期损失;商业银行偿付能力提高时,流动性风险会降低;商业银行流动性风险上升时,偿付能力风险也上升.     

Explaining banking stability in Sub-Saharan Africa

The study examined banking stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results reveal that banking spread (Net Interest Margin – NIM) is the main determinant of stability and the major means to achieve stability during crises periods. We however find the existence of a threshold effect in NIM.Crises in the banking sector consistently showed to reduce stability. While the results show that high percentage of foreign banks reduce stability, we find foreign banks help stabilize the banking sector in periods of crises. The results show that diversification could also have a positive impact on stability (Z-score) even though this relationship was not robust enough. The results also largely support the competition-fragility view. Particularly, we find that less competition during crises periods can help improve stability. Again, we find evidence for both concentration-stability and concentration-fragility hypotheses depending on the stability measure used. We however find that when large banks in concentrated markets are well regulated, stability could be improved. Weak regulatory environment reduces stability (Z-score) directly and matters during crises periods. Our results are robust to the use of different indicators of stability and estimation methods.     

Which Net Capital Flows Matter?

This article classifies extreme net capital flow episodes into four types and analyzes the macroeconomic impacts of each type. First, we find that all types of episodes increased drastically in the 2000s relative to previous years. Second, we conclude that liability-flow-driven episodes have more significant macroeconomic impacts than do asset-flow-driven episodes. Third, we show that only drastic positive net capital flows that were driven by liability flows were associated with a higher probability of banking crises in the 2000s. The results suggest that the detailed classification of extreme net capital flows provides insight into these movements’ macroeconomic impacts and policy implementations.